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Abstract. We investigate the effect of spells of no formal employment of young
Germans on their chances of entering the labor market through an apprenticeship. We also
study whether the potential negative effects of such spells can be mitigated by publicly pro-
vided training measures. In a field experiment, the fictitious applications of three young
women were sent to firms advertising apprenticeships for the position of office manager.
One application was from a fresh school-leaver and two from applicants who had been
out of school for two years, where one of them had participated in a training measure. We
find that applicants who have been out of school for two years and have participated in
the training are more successful than older applicants without additional training. We do
not find a significant difference between older applicants with or without training and
fresh school leavers. Our findings show that training measures increase the attractiveness
of applicants and that the potential stigma of spells of no formal employment after school
are compensated by informal work experience or age or a combination of both.
JEL classification: I28, J64, C93.
Keywords: Field experiment; apprenticeship; hiring decisions; informal and
formal employment; training.
1. INTRODUCTION
Entering the labor market is an important stage in people’s lives, since the first job
can have a lasting effect on the entire career. Therefore, young adults and youths
often feel under pressure to avoid gaps of unemployment after finishing school. But
how harmful are such gaps really? Do early career mishaps affect future employ-
ment? Do employers interpret gaps after finishing school as a bad sign of an appli-
cant’s abilities? And can job searchers make up for the gaps with the help of other
activities, such as additional training? The answers to these questions are important
for labor market policies, and they also shed light on the relevance of human capital
effects, signaling, employer herding and stigma at this early stage of people’s careers.
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Addressing the problems of youths without a formal employment is high on the
political agenda in many countries. But it is not well understood what causes the
difficulties of some youths to find such employment. While it is a common
research practice to use data on job placements, this placement is the joint result
of the applicants’ preferences, their search behavior as well as other unobserved
characteristics on the one hand, and employer preferences and hiring behavior on
the other. Therefore, the finding that a spell of no formal employment after school
goes along with a low employment probability is not necessarily due to employers
evaluating those applicants less favorably. It could also be caused by characteristics
of the applicants that are observable to the employer but not to the researcher,
such as the quality of the application, or differences in search behavior.
This study focuses on the role of employers. However, one difficulty with asking
them directly about their recruitment criteria is that it may induce socially desirable
answers.1 We therefore conducted a field experiment to study employer behavior
and to identify what the real pressures are on adolescents entering the labor market.
The field experiment was conducted in the main entry-level labor market for
youths in Germany, namely the market for apprenticeships. The apprenticeship
system is an important feature of the German labor market, since more than
60% of all school leavers start an apprenticeship every year (BMBF, 2012). Most
other school leavers enter university, and only a small fraction starts neither an
apprenticeship nor tertiary education. The majority of apprentices move on to
regular employment at the firm that trained them (BIBB, 2012). Therefore, hiring
procedures for apprentices are similar to those for other employees in Germany.
Our first question is whether applicants who have been out of school for two
years without starting an apprenticeship are evaluated less favorably by employ-
ers than recent school leavers.2 Our second research question addresses whether
applicants who do not start an apprenticeship after finishing school can improve
their chances of employment by getting additional training. In particular, we
study whether participating in a voluntary one-year prevocational training
program helps these youths or whether it carries a stigma.3
Our experimental design is as follows. We compare three applicants, namely
two applicants who have been out of school for two years and a fresh school-
1. This is of particular concern due to recent campaigns in Germany to help applicants who do not
apply as fresh school leavers to find an apprenticeship position. Youths searching for an appren-
ticeship position who have been out of school for more than a year (‘Altbewerber’) have been
the focus of a number of policy measures. A subsidy for firms employing such applicants with a
lower secondary degree was in place from 2008 to 2010.
2. Since the market is competitive, many applicants do not find an apprenticeship position. At the
same time, many apprenticeship positions remain unfilled, mainly due to regional and occupa-
tional mismatch as well as the perception that the quality of the applicants is too low (German
Federal Employment Agency, 2017).
3. Youths without an apprenticeship position can enter the so-called ‘transition system’ consisting of
various publicly funded one-year training programs that do not lead to a recognized vocational quali-
fication. Participation in such a training is voluntary in some German states (including Berlin where
the experiment was conducted), but not in others. Every year around 300,000 adolescents participate
in the system (see Authoring Group Educational Reporting, 2012, p. 11), which costs the public more
than four billion Euros per year (Klemm, 2012). Baethge et al. (2007) provide a description of the var-
ious measures of the transition system, and the economic aspects of the system are discussed by
Fitzenberger et al. (2015). Kohlrausch (2012) elaborates on its potential stigmatizing effects.
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leaver. Among those who finished school two years ago, one has participated in a
one-year full-time prevocational training and the other has not. Both of the older
applicants are working in an informal job when they apply for apprenticeships.
This design choice allows us to have some control over the employers’ beliefs
about the applicants’ activities since leaving school. Note, however, that we can-
not distinguish between the effect of being older and of having some work experi-
ence in an informal job. Moreover, we study only female applicants.4
Furthermore, we run the experiment in two waves and vary the average school
grade of our applicants between the waves. In the first wave of the experiment, all
three applicants had good grades while in the second wave, their grades were only
satisfactory. In this way, we attempt to assess whether any effects of spells of no
formal employment hold for different grade levels. As we only vary the average
grades between waves and do not randomize grades within one wave, the effect of
the grade might also capture other factors that change over time and that influ-
ence the effect of spells of no formal employment on invitation rates.5
We find that across both waves older applicants with training are invited most
often, followed by fresh school leavers and then by older applicants without
training. However, only the invitation rates of older applicants with and without
training are significantly different. Thus, we find that prevocational training
makes older applicants who are two years out of school more attractive com-
pared to older applicants without such training. In particular, the trained appli-
cants of wave 1 with good grades are 10% more likely to receive a callback based
on their written application and the trained applicants with satisfactory grades
of wave 2 are even 38% more likely compared to those without the training.
There is no significant difference in invitation rates between fresh school lea-
vers and older applicants, with or without prevocational training. While it is pos-
sible that not starting an apprenticeship right after school carries some stigma, it
is compensated by a positive effect of age, by working in an informal job or a
combination of both.6 Overall, the results suggest that youths can take their time
to grow before entering the labor market, especially if they participate in prevo-
cational training measures. In institutional settings where these measures are vol-
untary, they possibly allow students to acquire human capital and signal self-
discipline and motivation (Bedard, 2001; Spence, 1973), and they appear to be
particularly useful for applicants with only satisfactory grades.
4. We did not vary the gender since this would have doubled the amount of data to be collected,
either by sending out six instead of three fictitious applications to each firm or by sending out
applications to more firms. We decided against this, since we did not want to overburden firms
and since the number of firms looking for an apprentice in the relevant profession is limited. For
the same reason, also other studies investigating unemployment duration effects have focused
on one gender (Farber et al., 2015; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008).
5. For instance, the economic conditions might change between the waves. It is in this respect reas-
suring that (i) the number of vacant apprenticeship positions per 100 young people interested in
taking up an apprenticeship was almost identical in Berlin during both waves (BIBB, 2014), and
(ii) the number of newly signed apprenticeship contracts for office managers also did not vary
substantially in Berlin between 2011 and 2013 (BIBB, 2018). Finally, note that the effect of the
grade on invitation rates clearly goes in the expected direction (see below).
6. A stigma effect is predicted by the literature on employer herding where employers learn from
the negative decisions by other employers. See Gibbons and Katz (1991), K€ubler and Weizs€acker
(2003), Lockwood (1991), as well as Biewen and Steffes (2010).
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2. RELATED LITERATURE
Duration or scarring effects (i.e., long-lasting adverse effects on pay and employ-
ment) that are due to youth unemployment have been studied by a number of
contributions. Youth unemployment has been shown to be correlated with lower
wages (M€oller and Umkehrer, 2015 for Germany as well as Oreopoulos et al.,
2012 for the US, and Gregg and Tominey, 2005 for the UK) and with adult
unemployment (Gregg, 2001) or both (Mroz and Savage, 2006). The evidence on
the effects of informal jobs or of the underemployment of youths is mixed
(Bosch and Maloney, 2010; Cruces et al., 2012). In a study on the Job Corps pro-
gram in the US, a training program that is somewhat comparable to the transi-
tion system in Germany, Schochet et al. (2008) show that participation leads to
better educational outcomes, reduces criminal activities and increases earnings
for several years after the program.7
All papers on duration effects mentioned above focus on the long-term effects
of early unemployment. In contrast, our study asks whether scars can already
originate within two years after leaving school by lowering the chances of find-
ing the first formal employment. Similar to our study, Franz et al. (2000) con-
sider the entire process of youths entering the labor market and also investigate
the transition from school to an apprenticeship. They combine several adminis-
trative and survey datasets, but do not focus on the role of a delayed start into
vocational training.
None of the studies mentioned so far uses an experimental approach. Therefore,
both the employer’s decisions and differences between applicants with respect to
their application and search that are unobservable to the researcher could be driv-
ing the outcomes. A number of experimental studies on the effect of spells of
unemployment have been conducted where fictitious applications were sent out
to employers, using the design of audit studies that have first been employed in
the context of discrimination (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).8 A field
experiment in Switzerland by Oberholzer-Gee (2008) documents unemployment
stigma for administrative assistants. In contrast to our experiment, the reasons for
the stigma are not investigated, for example, by varying the occupation of the
applicants while they are unemployed. Three field experiments were conducted
recently in the US and in Sweden. Kroft et al. (2013) find for the US that the largest
decline in the likelihood of receiving a callback occurs in the first eight months,
and that the adverse effect is stronger the tighter the labor market. Eriksson and
Rooth (2014) conducted a large study in Sweden including jobs requiring different
skill levels. They observe no negative effects during the first six months of unem-
ployment, but after nine months there are clear duration effects for jobs requiring
low to intermediate skills. For high-skilled applicants and jobs, there is no such
effect. They also find that long-term unemployment in the past does not matter
while work experience is very important. Farber et al. (2015) document for female
7. The Job Corps program is a large, federally funded training program for disadvantaged youths
aged 16–24, lasting an average of eight months.
8. In Germany, where employers require application packages to include certificates from school,
photographs, etc., only a few such studies have been conducted, one recent example being Kaas
and Manger (2012) on ethnic discrimination in the market for student internships.
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clerical workers that spells of unemployment are more damaging for older appli-
cants and that taking up a lower-level interim job is harmful.
There are two field experiments on labor market entrants that we are aware of,
both of them conducted in the US. Deming et al. (2016) vary the college from
which applicants received their degree (for-profit or public, online vs. ‘brick and
mortar’, more vs. less selective). Closer to our experiment is the study by Nunley
et al. (2017) which estimates the effect of underemployment of college graduates.
By varying the length of the employment gap (3, 6 and 12 months) as well as
the type of previous employment (requiring or not requiring a college degree) in
their CVs, they find underemployment to be more harmful than unemployment.
Aside from the difference between the US and the German institutional context,
our study differs from their experiment in that we focus on longer gaps of two
years after leaving school, and that we consider the effect of additional training
measures on the likely success of applicants.
3. CONTEXT OF THE EXPERIMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to design the experiment in a meaningful way, we conducted 10 expert
interviews with human resource managers at large firms located in Berlin where
the field experiment was later implemented. The interviews helped us to gain a
good understanding of the hiring procedure of apprentices. We asked the man-
agers about their recruitment procedures and about what kind of screening is
done at which step. It turned out that recruitment procedures are similar across
firms. The structure of the recruitment process that emerged from the interviews
is described in the next section. Furthermore, we collected a number of written
applications for apprenticeship positions from students in previous years in order
to make our fictitious applications as realistic as possible.
3.1. Recruitment process
The apprenticeship positions are advertised at online job portals, on the com-
pany’s website or both. The advertisements define the target population by stating
the desired characteristics of applicants. From the expert interviews that we con-
ducted, it emerged that the typical recruitment process for apprentices in large
companies can be described as a sequence of steps. Only those applicants proceed
to the next step who have been evaluated positively at the preceding step.
In the first step, a selection is made based on the written applications, and it
is only at this step that the written application plays the dominant role. Relevant
criteria are the school degree, the school grades, teachers’ reports on non-cogni-
tive skills and the overall impression of the applicant based on the CV. Those
participants who passed the first step (the proportion of them varying across
firms, years and professions) are invited to the second step. There, applicants
take a test of German, maths as well as other subjects taught at school, some-
times also IQ tests. Third, those who pass the test are invited to interviews. The
interviews serve to assess an applicant’s personality, motivation, the vocational
interest as well as the communication and team-working skills. After this final
step, job offers are made.
D. K€ubler et al.
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The experiment focuses on the employers’ choices made in the first step. Of
course, we cannot know whether our applicants would have been able to pass
further steps. However, the first step poses a significant hurdle for the applicants
(only 30–60% of the applicants in our experiment pass it), and it is exactly at
the first hurdle that the characteristics of the applicants that we vary are of pri-
mary importance. In particular, it is at the first step that the school grades and
the CV play the main role for the employers’ decisions. Hence, our approach
allows us to gauge the relevance of information conveyed by the CV, such as
spells of no formal employment, which is our variable of interest.
3.2. Research questions
We study the effects of spells of no formal employment of adolescents on their
employment opportunities. In particular, we hypothesize that applicants who have
been out of school for two years have a lower chance of being invited to the next
step of the recruitment process based on their written application than applicants
who have just finished school. Second, we test the hypothesis that applicants who
participate in training measures between leaving school and the application can
thereby avoid some of the negative effects of spells of no formal employment.
To investigate these issues, we create applications for ‘new’ applicants who are
just finishing school and for ‘old’ applicants who have been out of school for
two years without starting an apprenticeship. We distinguish between two types
of old applicants, depending on their activities during their spell of no formal
employment. In particular, we compare an applicant who has participated in vol-
untary full-time prevocational training with an applicant who has not partici-
pated in such a training.
The differentiation between the two types of old applicants allows us to inves-
tigate whether the potential negative effects of not starting an apprenticeship
right after school can be compensated by participating in a training measure or
whether this is counterproductive. We run our experiment in Berlin where
mandatory schooling ends after grade 10. Thus, participating in the non-selective
training measure is voluntary.9
Prevocational training programs are targeted at youths who could not find an
apprenticeship position. However, the majority of youths participating in a pre-
vocational training in Germany do not find a regular employment or an appren-
ticeship afterwards (see e.g., Baethge et al., 2007). The reasons for this
observation are not well understood. It could simply be caused by a selection
effect in that students who are less attractive for employers end up taking prevo-
cational training. However, it is also possible that prevocational training carries a
stigma and therefore leads to unsuccessful applications later on. These negative
stigma effects could be stronger than the potential increase in human capital.
On the positive side, the prevocational training may also signal desirable traits
such as motivation and self-discipline since participation is voluntary. With the
9. Some German states require 12 years of schooling, some nine and some have age limits in com-
bination with years of schooling. In some states, the prevocational training counts as part of a
higher schooling degree or school-based vocational training, see Fitzenberger and Licklederer
(2015), but this is not the case in Berlin where our study was conducted.
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help of the experiment, we can exclude selection effects since we have control
over the applicant pool and we can thereby study the direct effect of the training
measure on the responses by employers.
4. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
We sent out applications for apprenticeships of office manager (B€urokauffrau)
and office clerk (Kauffrau f€ur B€urokommunikation). Both professions are similar
and for both of them employers require an intermediate secondary degree (MSA)
that students receive after ten years of schooling.10 Moreover, both professions
are at an upper intermediate level among apprenticeships in terms of competen-
cies required. Office managers and office clerks work in various industries. Also,
both professions are predominantly female, and office clerk is one of the most
frequent apprenticeships of women (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013).11 Since we
do not focus on gender differences and are limited in the number of applica-
tions, we can send to each firm, all our fictitious applicants are female.
For the sample, we restricted attention to firms with 30 or more employees in
Berlin that offered apprenticeship positions for office managers and office clerks
in 2011/12 and in 2012/13. For ethical reasons, we chose not to burden smaller
firms with the additional work of our fictitious applications.12 Since apprentices
typically live with their parents, the market for apprenticeships is local. Students
applying to firms outside of their home region are rare. Since our fictitious appli-
cations contain transcripts from local schools and home addresses in Berlin, we
restricted our experiment to firms in Berlin.
We conducted two waves of the experiment in consecutive years with the
same three applicant types (namely fresh school leavers and older applicants
with and without additional training), but with different average grades. The
average grade was kept constant for all applicants within one wave. By varying
the grade level between waves, we attempt to investigate whether the impact of
our experimental variables is robust and independent of the grade level.13 This
addresses an important limitation of correspondence studies, pointed out by
Heckman and Siegelman (1993), namely that the effect of the variable of interest
at the chosen grade or productivity level may differ from the overall effect.
Applications were sent out continuously from October 2011 to May 2012 and
from October 2012 to May 2013. The job ads appeared in this period of seven
months for positions starting in the summer of 2012 and 2013, respectively. The
10. The German school system provides three different degrees for those leaving school. The lower
secondary degree after nine years (Hauptschulabschluss), the intermediate secondary degree
after ten years (MSA or Realschulabschluss) and the upper secondary degree (Abitur).
11. Taking both male and female apprentices together, the two occupations are among the most
commonly chosen apprenticeships: office manager was ranked fourth and office clerk 13th in
Germany in 2013 (BIBB, 2013).
12. By accident, applications were sent to a few firms with less than 30 employees. We decided to
keep these observations in the sample.
13. However, varying the applicants’ grades between but not within waves comes at the cost that
other factors besides grades may drive any differences between waves.
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market conditions remained relatively stable in the two years, 2012 and 2013,
but we will consider each wave separately in the main part of the analysis.
We created three applicant types that we randomly assigned to fictitious appli-
cants to study the effect of no formal employment after school on the chances
of finding an apprenticeship. First, the New applicant is still at school and in her
last year (10th grade) at the time of the application. There are two old appli-
cants. Both of them finished school almost two years ago and currently have an
informal job. The Oldprevoc applicant has completed one year of prevocational
training whereas the Old applicant did not. No further information is given
about the activities of the old applicants since finishing school. Both Oldprevoc
and Old applicants have an intermediate-level degree while the New applicants
are ‘most likely to receive an intermediate-level degree’, according to their last
school report.
The main variables characterizing the three applicants in the design of wave 1
[wave 2] are depicted in Table A1. Moroever, all three have good to satisfactory
school grades with an average of 2.8 [3.2] and good evaluations of their non-cogni-
tive skills.14 Many youths who do not start an apprenticeship take on temporary
jobs to earn some pocket money, and we therefore included this information in the
CV. Both applicants are working as salespersons, one at a greengrocer’s and the
other at a bookstall. The two jobs are comparable in pay and prestige.15 The jobs
are non-selective and most likely convey less human capital than the prevocational
training. No mention is made in the CV as to how many hours the applicants work
in this job and for howmuch time they have been doing so.
Importantly, in Germany, employment that is not only temporary and the
probability to become unemployed correlate strongly with a completed appren-
ticeship.16 While it is possible that working in an informal job signals some
desirable characteristics to the employer, such as self-discipline, there is evidence
that working in a lower level interim job can have negative consequences on
employment opportunities (Farber et al., 2015; Nunley et al., 2017). Note that
since both older applicants work in such jobs, we can identify the effect of the
training measure.
The prevocational training that our applicants participated in comprises
coursework in German, English, Maths, law, business and some additional topics
as well as individual coaching measures and the development of soft skills. Thus,
the training is relevant for the professions of office manager and office clerk.
An application for an apprenticeship includes a letter of motivation, the CV
including a photograph of the applicant and copies of the last three school
14. In the German grading system, 1 is the best (very good) and 6 the worst grade. A grade of 2
indicates a good performance, 3 is satisfactory, 4 sufficient, and 5 and 6 are fail. The grade
transcripts also report on grades for non-cognitive skills such as participation in class and self-
discipline that were not varied in this study. For the relative importance of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills in the application process for apprenticeships see Protsch and Solga (2015).
15. The two jobs were not randomized so as to limit the complexity of the design.
16. In 2011, 16% of people between 25 and 35 years of age who had not completed an apprentice-
ship and were not currently enrolled in school, university or completing an apprenticeship were
unemployed. For those with completed vocational training or an academic degree, the unem-
ployment rate was only 5%. See German Federal Employment Agency (2013). This is, of course,
only correlational evidence.
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certificates. For each wave, we created three full application profiles with names,
addresses, etc. To make them as realistic as possible, we used the applications we
had collected in the field. These fictitious persons or profiles are fixed, that is, we
did not randomize their characteristics. Instead, the fictitious persons were ran-
domly assigned to the applicant types described in Table A1. Thus, for each job
advertisement, we responded to, we used an independent random device to deter-
mine which fictitious applicant was a fresh school-leaver, an older applicant with
and an older applicant without the training measure. We chose the fictitious pro-
files to be as comparable as possible. All fictitious applicants lived and attended
schools in the same district of Berlin. We thereby avoided differences between
profiles that are due to different socio-economic characteristics of districts. For
every firm that advertised an apprenticeship position, we randomly matched the
three fictitious profiles to the three applicant types (New, Oldprevoc and Old), and
sent out applications to the firm for all three applicants. Thus, every employer
received three applications from us.
For each fictitious applicant, we created an email account, a mobile phone
number and a postal address.17 Responses by firms were usually received via
phone (answering machine) or email. Whenever one of our applicants received
an invitation to take the test, we recorded this and immediately declined the
offer in order to make place for a real applicant.
5. RESULTS
5.1. Responses by firms
Table A2 summarizes the main features of the dataset. Of the 249 firms we sent
applications to, 233 are part of our main dataset in which we consider consistent
responses by firms and treat missing values as rejections if and only if none of
the applicants received an actual notification of a rejection by the firm. Thus, we
exclude firms that did not respond to one of the applicants and rejected another.
To check for the robustness of our findings, we also comment on the results with
alternative treatments of missing responses.18
The proportions of all applicants who passed the first step of the hiring proce-
dure and were invited to the test are indicated in the lower panel of Table A2.
The invitation rates vary between 28.9% and 58.3%, depending on the wave and
the treatment of non-responses by firms. When we test for significance of the dif-
ferences in invitation rates between the sample consisting of the firms with con-
sistent responses and the sample of all firms, we do not find statistically
significant differences for each wave separately, nor for both waves together.19
There was an overlap of 43 firms in waves 1 and 2. We employed profiles with
different individual characteristics of the three applicants between the waves
17. We used postal addresses in the relevant district of Berlin by adding nameplates to the mail-
boxes of collaborators who informed us of any incoming mail.
18. In particular, we investigate the data based on all responses, treating non-responses as missings,
as well as the dataset where firms gave a complete response to all three applicants. All tables for
these alternative ways to treat missing responses are reported in Appendix A5.
19. We also checked which firms gave consistent feedback. It turns out that firms that provide con-
sistent feedback are, on average, smaller than firms in the full sample.
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(name, address, photograph, CV, cover letter, school certificates). We have no
indication that receiving applications from us twice but with different profiles
created any suspicion on the part of the firms.
Importantly, our choice of names, addresses, photographs, etc., for the three ficti-
tious applicants in each wave was successful in that the employers considered them
to be roughly similar. In particular, we do not find any significant differences between
the likelihood of the three fictitious applicants receiving an invitation in each of the
two waves (see Appendix A1). This allows us to detect an effect of the applicant type
(New, Oldprevoc, Old), since it is not dominated by differences in the relative attractive-
ness of the fictitious applicants. Such differences could entail that one of the appli-
cant types is always invited while the other two never receive interview offers.
5.2. Experimental results
Our main result concerns the invitation rates of the three applicant types, dis-
played in Figure A1. It emerges that while the differences between applicants are
not large, in both waves the percentages of applicants who received an invitation
are ordered in the same way: Old applicants with prevocational training
(Oldprevoc) are most likely to receive an invitation, followed by new applicants
(New) who in turn are more likely to receive an invitation than old applicants
without the training (Old). Note that the set-up of the experiments was the same
in both waves aside from the average grades that are worse in the second wave
(average grade of 2.8 in wave 1 vs. 3.2 in wave 2).
Table A3 contains the p-values of the McNemar test for the difference between
the average invitation rates of the treatments.20 The difference between Oldprevoc
and Old is not significant in wave 1 but is significant at the 1% level in wave 2
as well as in both waves together. Comparing the two old applicants, participa-
tion in a prevocational training increases the invitation rate by 10% from 0.56 to
0.61 in wave 1 and by about 38% from 0.26 to 0.36 in wave 2. Note that the dif-
ference between Oldprevoc and New is not statistically significant in both waves
when they are considered separately or together. The difference is larger in wave
2 than in wave 1. Both findings suggest that prevocational training helps school
leavers with relatively poor grades more than those with good grades. Finally,
the difference between New and Old is not significant.21
We also present the results of OLS models to assess the effect of the applicant
type on the invitation rate in Table A4. For these regressions, we pool the data
from both waves and introduce a dummy for wave 2 that is set equal to 0 for
wave 1. Oldprevoc is the base category.
22
20. The McNemar test is a non-parametric test for paired proportions assessing whether a statisti-
cally significant change in proportions has occurred on a dichotomous trait. It uses the chi-
square test statistic. In our sample, the differences between the invitation rates of the applicant
types are due to those firms that treat them differently.
21. Strictly speaking, non-parametric tests are not applicable for both waves together due to the
overlap of 43 firms in wave 1 and 2. McNemar tests applied to the data of both waves but
excluding overlapping firms in wave 2 [wave 1] yield similar results with p = 0.002 [p = 0.004]
for the comparison of Oldprevoc and Old, and no significant differences for the comparison of
Oldprevoc and New, and Old and New.
22. We report the results from a probit regression in the appendix. They are very similar.
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The regressions corroborate the results from the non-parametric tests. Over
both waves, Old applicants have a significantly lower chance of being invited
compared to applicants of the base category Oldprevoc (columns 1 and 2). There is
no statistically significant difference between New applicants and Oldprevoc appli-
cants. Considering each wave separately (column 3) yields an insignificant differ-
ence between Oldprevoc and Old applicants in wave 1 (p = 0.158) but a significant
difference in wave 2 (p = 0.002).23 Thus, the findings based on non-parametric
tests are confirmed. Finally, we find a significantly negative and large effect of
the grade as indicated by the coefficient of Iwave2 in column 2.
If we estimate the model using the dataset with complete responses by firms
only and pooling both waves, New and Old applicants have a significantly lower
probability of being invited than applicants of the base category Oldprevoc.
24 Con-
sidering each wave separately yields a significant difference between Oldprevoc and
Old applicants for both waves, and a marginally significant difference between
Oldprevoc and New in wave 2. Regressions based on all responses – including firms
with inconsistent feedback – yield a significant difference between Oldprevoc and
Old applicants and a marginally significant difference between Oldprevoc and New
applicants. If we consider each wave separately for this dataset, the results also
indicate a significant difference between Oldprevoc and Old applicants for both
waves. The difference between Oldprevoc and New applicants is, however, not sig-
nificant for either wave if considered separately.
Hence, across all datasets and waves, there is weak evidence that Oldprevoc appli-
cants are more likely to be invited to an interview than New applicants. Moreover,
no matter how we define the dataset, we find a robust difference between old appli-
cants who participated in the training program and old applicants who did not.
Thus, the training makes older applicants significantly more likely to be invited.
5.3. Heterogeneity
In this section, we focus on the question of whether the observed differences in
invitation rates vary with certain characteristics of the firm or the application for-
mat. We collected three variables describing the firms that we sent applications to
and the application format, summarized in Table A5. These variables include the
size and private or state ownership of the firm as well as how the application was
submitted (email, mail or online).25 The size of the firm may affect the profession-
alization of its hiring practices while private or state ownership can make a
23. The p-values in wave 2 are obtained by Wald tests of the sum of the coefficients on the dummy
of the applicant type and the corresponding interaction with wave 2 against zero.
24. The regression results are reported in Appendix A2.
25. When we categorize the firms in our sample into different industry classes (‘Agriculture, For-
estry, Mining’, ‘Manufacturing’, ‘Construction’, ‘Trade & Repair’, ‘Business Services’, ‘Other Ser-
vices’, ‘Medical & Nursing Services’ and ‘Public Service & Education’), we find that service
providers drive the positive effect of the voluntary training program on invitation rates for
older applicants. In contrast, the difference between fresh school leavers and applicants who
have been out of school for two years and work in informal jobs but did not participate in the
training is insignificant for all categories. Note, however, that due to sample size restrictions
this heterogeneity analysis is only meaningful for a subset of these classes.
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difference with respect to the overall objectives of the firm. Finally, the format that
is required for the application may be correlated with the hiring practices of the
firm.
For 222 of the 233 firms, we were able to obtain information about their size
measured by the number of employees. The mean number of employees is
2,832. The firm size distribution is highly skewed, and the median number of
employers is 250. The number of employees spans a wide range, from 9 to
56,000. We classify firms into three categories: small firms that have fewer than
50 employees (11.59% of firms), intermediate firms that have between 51 and
500 employees (45.06%) and large firms with more than 500 employees
(38.63%). Furthermore, we are able to differentiate between privately owned
firms and firms in state ownership. The large majority of firms in our sample
(84.98%) are in private ownership. About 15% are owned by the state or local
public authorities. In addition, we can differentiate whether the application was
sent via e-mail, via mail or created online. The large majority of applications
(74.68%) were sent via e-mail. The remaining applications are split almost
equally between mail (13.73%) and online applications (11.59%).
To analyze how the effect of participating in prevocational training varies with
these characteristics of the firm and the application format, we pool the data
from both waves and regress the invitation decision on a dummy for new appli-
cants, old applicants, one of the moderators, the interaction of the dummy for
old applicants and the moderator, and a dummy for wave. We first consider the
comparison of old applicants with and without training, and then turn to the
results regarding fresh school leavers.
Regarding the role of firm size, we observe that the negative effect for old
applicants of not participating in the training is marginally significant for small
firms and significant at the 1% level for firms of intermediate size. The effect is
statistically insignificant for large firms and for the 33 observations for which we
lack the firm size information. Thus, the positive effect of the training seems to
apply in particular for firms of small and intermediate size.
With respect to firms in private or state ownership, we find for private firms
that Old applicants have a 9.5 percentage points lower chance of being invited
than Oldprevoc applicants, which is significant. In contrast, for state-owned firms
the effect of the training is small and not significantly different from zero.
If we compare Old and Oldprevoc applicants for different application formats (e-
mail, mail, online), we find a significant effect of the training for the largest
group (e-mail). The positive effect of the training is even more pronounced for
applications which were made by mail or online, amounting to 11.3 and 11.2
percentage points, respectively. However, due to the small number of firms in
these two categories, the effect is significantly different from zero only at the
10% level.
Finally, we also investigate whether the insignificant difference between New
and Oldprevoc applicants in Table A4 masks heterogeneous effects depending on
firm characteristics or the application format. We find no statistically significant
effect for any of the categories, with one exception: For state-owned firms, we
observe a marginally significant and negative effect of being a New applicant
compared to applying as an Oldprevoc applicant. Hence, state-owned firms seem
to prefer fresh school leavers compared to older applicants.
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The heterogeneity analysis yields two take-aways. First, prevocational training
increases invitation rates of older applicants by small and intermediate firms.
One reason for this finding could be that the participation in the training gets
more attention in smaller firms because of less standardized hiring procedures.
Second, the advantage of older applicants with prevocational training is driven
by firms in private ownership.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
What matters in the first screening of young applicants by employers? Two main
conclusions can be drawn from our findings. First, we observe that participation
in a voluntary training program for youths without an apprenticeship has a sig-
nificantly positive effect: Older applicants with one year of training are more
attractive than older applicants without training. The participation in the volun-
tary training program can signal desirable traits such as diligence and self-disci-
pline, but the training may also convey human capital that is valued by the
employers.
Second, we find that the potential stigma attached to not starting an appren-
ticeship right after school is compensated by work experience and/or age. Fresh
school leavers are not more likely to receive an invitation compared to appli-
cants who have been out of school for two years and who are working in infor-
mal jobs. Thus, at this early stage of life not starting an apprenticeship right
after school does not have a strong negative effect – at least not strong enough
to dominate the potentially positive effect of age and some work experience in
an informal job. In fact, it could be either the higher age, the work experience in
an informal job or the combination of both that causes applicants who have
been out of school for some time to be as attractive to employers as fresh school
leavers. The employers’ attitude toward fresh school leavers may also partly be
driven by the fact that their final grade is still uncertain when they apply for the
position.
Overall, we do not observe a negative effect of taking up a lower level interim
job, in contrast to Nunley et al. (2017) and Farber et al. (2015). Our result, that
older applicants who are working in an informal job do not fare worse than fresh
school leavers, also differs from findings regarding the effects of unemployment
later in life where negative duration effects are documented for Sweden after
nine months (Eriksson and Rooth, 2014) or even within the first eight months
(Kroft et al., 2013) in the US. While it seems possible that the effect of under-
and unemployment spells is non-monotone over the working life, a systematic
study of this question is still missing.
The result of no disadvantage for older applicants does not contradict studies
that find scarring effects of early unemployment. Rather, we are able to demon-
strate that negative effects of not having started an apprenticeship for two years
after school on the probability of being invited to an interview are not caused by
the employers. This does not preclude negative effects after longer spells of no
formal employment or at later stages of the recruitment process, nor adverse
effects on the behavior of applicants, for example, due to the demoralizing
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experience of not finding an apprenticeship. Also, applicants who start an
apprenticeship later have less work experience, which could lead to lower future
earnings.
Our findings suggest that the voluntary participation in a prevocational train-
ing measure improves the employment chances of older applicants. A natural
question is why the rate of students taking up an apprenticeship after the prevo-
cational training is rather low at the national level (around 40%, see Baethge
et al., 2007). First, note that in Berlin (but not in some other German states) such
training is voluntary, thereby allowing applicants to signal positive characteris-
tics such as self-discipline and motivation. In other states where the training is
mandatory, its signaling value may be lower. Moreover, note that the content
and extent of prevocational training measures vary between German states.
Hence, generalizations to other states should be treated with caution. Second,
our experimental set-up excludes the possibility that old and new applicants dif-
fer with respect to the written applications, test-taking skills, search behavior
and skills in job interviews. Thus, fostering such competencies in older appli-
cants may improve their chances of getting an apprenticeship.
The field experiment was conducted with female applicants. Therefore, the
effect of spells of no formal employment of young men remains an open ques-
tion. Note, however, that Kroft et al. (2013) report similar duration dependence
estimates for men and women. Moreover, reanalyzing the data of Eriksson and
Rooth (2014) we find that their main results hold for men and women.26
The field experiment focused on two occupations that are among the most fre-
quently chosen apprenticeships: office manager and office clerk. Employers typi-
cally ask for an intermediate secondary degree, and the occupations are relatively
demanding. It is unclear whether the positive effect of participating in the train-
ing program would be more or less pronounced for occupations that require
lower competence levels. On the one hand, for such occupations the training
received by completing the program may be less relevant. On the other hand,
the average quality of applicants for these jobs might be lower and, in turn, the
signaling effect of participating in the training program might be more pro-
nounced.
The study highlights the importance of an experimental approach to identify
the determinants of success and failure of labor market entrants, since a causal
relationship between the occupation after leaving school and the employer’s
response can be established. Overall, the results suggest that giving youths with-
out formal employment the possibility to acquire more human capital and to
send positive signals about themselves can provide them with time to grow and
to postpone a definite choice for a profession. This seems especially valuable
given the high rate of premature terminations of apprenticeship contracts
(20–25% of all contracts over the past decade, see BIBB, 2014).
26. Our re-estimations of the data of Eriksson and Rooth (2014) separately for men and women
yield no duration dependence for women and men separately for the entire sample, nor for
high-skill jobs. This coincides with the findings by Eriksson and Rooth (2014) for the full sam-
ple of men and women. Analyzing medium- and low-skill jobs, the coefficient on unemploy-
ment of nine months remains similar in size for each gender separately (below 0.03) though it
is significant only for male applicants.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Tables





Wave 1 + 2
No. of firms applied
to (no. of applications)
115 (345) 134 (402) 249 (747)
No. of firms with consistent
feedback [proportion]
111 [96.5%] 122 [91.1%] 233 [93.6%]
No. of invitations (all
applications) [proportion]
194 [56.2%] 116 [28.9%] 310 [41.5%]
No. of invitations (consistent
feedback) [proportion]
194 [58.3%] 115 [31.4%] 309 [44.2%]
Table A3 Results of McNemar tests
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 + 2
Oldprevoc vs. Old 0.157 0.003 0.002
New vs. Oldprevoc 0.414 0.317 0.199
New vs. Old 0.655 0.144 0.170
N 111 122 233
Table A1 Three types of applicants in waves 1 [& 2]
New applicant Oldprevoc applicant Old applicant
10th grade student,








secondary degree in 2010 [2011]
Followed a one-year
prevocational program
Currently has a temporary
informal job
Currently has a temporary
informal job
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Table A4 OLS regression for invitations of applicants
(1) (2) (3)
INew 0.039 0.039 0.036
(0.031) (0.031) (0.044)




INew  Iwave2 0.005
(0.059)
IOld  Iwave2 0.044
(0.050)
Constant 0.481*** 0.621*** 0.613***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.047)
N 699 699 699
Notes: Regressions based on consistent responses by firms where missing values are treated as rejec-
tions if and only if none of the applicants received a rejection (pooled data of waves 1 and 2). Values
in parentheses represent standard errors corrected for clusters at the firm level. Asterisks represent
p-values: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table A5 Heterogeneity analysis
Firm size Small Mid Large NoInfo
Proportion 11.59% 45.06% 38.63% 4.72%
bOld 0.112* 0.086*** 0.058 0.065
bNew 0.020 0.034 0.044 0.084




Application format E-mail Mail Online
Proportion 74.68% 13.73% 11.59%
bOld 0.065** 0.113* 0.112*
bNew 0.050 0.008 0.020
Notes: Analysis based on 699 observations, that is, 233 firms providing consistent responses. The row
‘proportion’ yields the proportion of observations (firms) per category. bOld and bNew show the effect
of applying as an old applicant with prevocational training and as a new applicant on the invitation
rate per category. Firms are counted for every wave. There was an overlap of 43 firms in waves 1 and
2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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A.2. Figure
A.3. Fictitious applicant profiles
We created six fictitious applicant profiles, three for wave 1 and three for wave 2.
Each of the six application packages contained a cover letter and CV, which dif-
fered slightly in style and layout. We chose six common female first names in
the birth cohorts of 1993–96 and combined them with six frequent last names
resulting in Anna Schmidt (profile 1), Laura Kr€uger (profile 2) and Carolin Leh-
mann (profile 3) in wave 1, Alina Hoffmann (profile 1), Jana Schr€oder (profile 2)
and Sara Weber (profile 3) in wave 2. All applicants have similar family back-
grounds, hobbies, attend(ed) similar schools, live in the same large district of
Berlin, and are similarly attractive according to their photographs. For the new
applicants, we submitted the two school reports from grade 9, and the final
grade 8 report (for early applications before February) or the mid-year report of
grade 10 (for late applications). For old applicants, we submitted the two school
reports from grade 10 as well as the final report from grade 9. Figure A2 contains
the sample of an actual application. We edited out part of the application photo
for privacy reasons, but it is available upon request.
Figure A1 Invitation rates of the three applicant types
Notes: The figure is based on all consistent responses by firms where missing values are
treated as rejections if none of the applicants received a rejection. Confidence intervals
are 95% binomial confidence intervals.
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Figure A2 Sample of an application [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibra
ry.com]
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Table A6 provides statistical evidence that our three fictitious applicants per
wave were similarly attractive to the employers. Note that each of the fictitious
profiles was randomly matched to one of the three applicant types (New,
Oldprevoc, Old) for every application. The invitation rates for fictitious applicants
1, 2 and 3 are almost identical in wave 1. In wave 2, the invitation rate for ficti-
tious applicant 2 is a bit lower than for fictitious applicant 1 and 2. However,
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the differences are not large and all fictitious applicant types receive a sizeable
number of both invitations and rejections.
A.4. Probit
In this section, we document the results that we obtain when we use probit
models instead of OLS (see Table A7).
Table A6 Invitation rates by fictitious applicant profile and wave
Fictitious profile Wave 1 Wave 2
1 Mean 0.586 0.344
[SEM] [0.047] [0.043]
n 111 121
2 Mean 0.550 0.270
[SEM] [0.047] [0.040]
n 111 121




1 vs. 2 0.371 0.072
1 vs. 3 0.491 0.670
2 vs. 3 0.144 0.090
Note: Numbers are based on the sample of firms with consistent responses. Values in square brackets
represent standard errors of the mean [SEM].
Table A7 Probit regression for invitations of applicants
(1) (2) (3)
INew 0.038 0.038 0.034
(0.030) (0.030) (0.042)




INew  Iwave2 0.007
(0.058)
IOld  Iwave2 0.052
(0.049)
N 699 699 699
logL 478.40 452.53 452.32
v2ðk1Þ 9.87 37.80 38.84
Notes: Regressions based on consistent responses by firms, where missing values are treated as rejec-
tions if none of the applicants received a rejection (pooled data of waves 1 and 2). We report mar-
ginal effects. Values in parentheses represent standard errors corrected for clusters at the firm level.
Asterisks represent p-values: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.5. Alternative treatments of missing values
In this section, we document the main results depending on the treatment of
non-responses by firms. In Table A8, we consider only responses by firms that
provided complete feedback.
In Table A9, we include all observations, and non-responses of firms are
treated as missing values.
Table A8 Probit regression for invitations of applicants
(1) (2) (3)
INew 0.065** 0.065** 0.046
(0.031) (0.031) (0.043)




INew  Iwave2 0.037
(0.063)
IOld  Iwave2 0.015
(0.052)
N 552 552 552
logL 381.05 356.84 356.76
v2ðk1Þ 11.24 33.98 34.37
Notes: Regressions based on responses where firms provided complete feedback (pooled data of waves
1 and 2). We report marginal effects. Values in parentheses represent standard errors corrected for
clusters at the firm level. Asterisks represent p-values: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table A9 Probit regression for invitations of applicants
(1) (2) (3)
INew 0.051* 0.052* 0.049
(0.031) (0.030) (0.043)




INew  IWave2 0.004
(0.060)
IOld  IWave2 0.025
(0.052)
N 615 615 615
logL 424.83 396.70 396.66
v2ðk1Þ 10.26 39.57 39.87
Notes: Regressions based on all observations, and non-responses are treated as missing values (pooled
date of waves 1 and 2). We report marginal effects. Values in parentheses represent standard errors
corrected for clusters at the firm level. Asterisks represent p-values: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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